I. INTRODUCTION
A GGREGATE signatures (AS) [2] allow any third party to compress individual signatures by different signers on different messages into an aggregate signature of size considerably shorter than the sum of the sizes of the individual signatures, preferably independent of the number of signatures . Sequential aggregate signatures (SAS) [4] are a slightly restricted variant where the signers have to be organized in a sequence, each taking turns in adding their signature share onto the aggregate. Example applications of (S)AS schemes include secure routing protocols [6] , where routers authenticate paths in the network, and certificate chains in hierarchical public-key infrastructures, where certificate authorities (CA) authenticate public keys of lower-level CAs. Another important application area is that of battery-powered devices such as cell phones, PDAs, and wireless sensors that communicate over energy-consuming wireless channels.
Drawbacks of Existing Schemes:
In the public-key (i.e., nonidentity-based) setting, only three (S)AS schemes are presently known: the pairing-based [2] and [3] schemes, and the [4] scheme based on families of certified [7] trapdoor permutations, but that with some tricks can be instantiated with RSA. All three schemes have some drawbacks though.
Pairings were rather recently introduced to cryptography, and for the time being do not yet enjoy the same level of support in terms of standardization and implementations as for example RSA. The main disadvantage of the scheme on the other hand is that one of the tricks needed to turn RSA into a certified permutation is to use a verification exponent
. 1 This has a dramatic effect on the computational efficiency of signing and verification, because both require long-exponent exponentiations for an aggregate signature containing signatures.
Comparing this to pairing-based alternatives, the scheme also has rather expensive verification ( pairing computations), but at least has cheap signing (a single exponentiation). The scheme has quite cheap signing and verification (two pairings and multiplications), albeit at the price of only being secure in the weaker knowledge of secret key (KOSK) model that requires signers to hand over (or at least prove knowledge of) their secret keys to a trusted CA. Both pairing-based schemes have shorter signatures than the scheme: for a typical security level of 80 bits, the and schemes have 160-and 320-bit signatures, respectively, versus 1024 bits for . Finally, none of the existing schemes give the signers much freedom in choosing their own key sizes. This is particularly important for the certificate chain application, where a top-level CA probably wants higher-grade security than a private enduser. The pairing-based schemes require all signers to use the same elliptic-curve groups, so the signers have no influence over their key sizes whatsoever. The scheme offers a limited amount of freedom, but requires that signers within a sequence are arranged according to increasing key size, which is exactly the opposite of what is needed for certificate chains.
Our Contributions: We first observe that if one is truly concerned about saving bandwidth, then focusing solely on signature length is a bit arbitrary. Indeed, what really matters is the total amount of transmitted data, which contains messages, signatures, and in many applications the signers' public keys. (In fact, replacing the latter with shorter identity strings is the main motivation for identity-based aggregate signatures [11] , [12] .) We therefore state our results in terms of a new, generalized primitive that we call sequential aggregate signed data (SASD). The verification algorithm takes as only input the signed data , and outputs vectors of public keys and messages to indicate that correctly authenticates under for , or outputs to reject. The goal of the scheme is to keep the net bandwidth overhead to a minimum, i.e., the difference between the length of the signed data and that of the useful content . A comparison of currently known aggregate signature (AS), sequential aggregate signature (SAS), sequential aggregate signed data (SASD), multisignature (MS), and multisigned data (MSD) schemes, including the ones presented here, is given in Table I . For each scheme we display whether its security relies on the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) or random oracle (RO) assumptions, on which number-theoretic problems it can be based (P for pairings, R for RSA, F for factoring), the net bandwidth overhead in bits, the cost of signing, and the cost of verification. Only the predominant terms are displayed in efficiency measures. Symbols used are security parameters , , for pairings, factoring, and collision-resistance (typical values are , ); for the number of signers in an aggregation; for a pairing operation; for a (multi-)exponentiation; and for a multiplication. The overhead of the and schemes is displayed as an interval, as their overhead depends on the length of the messages being signed. More details on efficiency are provided in the sections where the schemes are introduced.
Next, we present our main construction, the scheme, based on families of trapdoor permutations in the random oracle model. Its main advantage over the scheme is that it does not require the permutations to be certified, thereby allowing much more efficient instantiations from low-exponent RSA and the first instantiation ever from factoring. The construction itself can be seen as combining ideas from the scheme and the PSS-R signature scheme with message recovery [13] ; the main technical contribution, we think, lies in the security proof, which requires complex "query bookkeeping" for the simulation to go through. The impact on efficiency is spectacular (see Table I ): verification takes a mere multiplications, signing takes one exponentiation and multiplications, and bandwidth overhead can be as low as 160 bits-something that until now seemed the exclusive privilege of pairing-based schemes. Moreover, the scheme allows signers to mix-and-match different key sizes at will, allowing much more flexibility for use in real applications.
There is a small caveat that our scheme only achieves its optimal bandwidth overhead for sufficiently long signed messages. Roughly, if the signers in the aggregation have key sizes , then we need that . To show that our efficiency gains are not only due to our generalization of the SAS primitive however, we also present a "purebred" SAS scheme that in most cases will have a larger bandwidth overhead than the scheme, about bits to be exact, but that otherwise shares all the advantages in efficiency and flexibility of the scheme. Multi-Signatures: A multi-signature (MS) scheme [14] is the natural equivalent of a (S)AS scheme where all signers authenticate the same message. The current state-of-the-art schemes based on RSA or factoring [15] have interactive signature generation; those based on pairings [3] , [5] are only secure in the KOSK setting. The scheme could be seen as a MS scheme (taking into account the issues [16] that arise when signing the same message), but has significantly less efficient verification.
Analogously to what we did for SASD schemes, we generalize the concept of MS schemes to multi-signed data (MSD) schemes. We present the scheme that is the first RSA and factoring-based scheme with noninteractive signature generation, and that is the first efficient noninteractive scheme secure in the plain public-key setting, i.e., without making the KOSK assumption. Unlike the scheme however, the bandwidth gains here are solely due to message recovery effects, and disappear completely when very short messages are being signed. to indicate rejection. Correctness requires that the with probability one for all messages when all signers behave honestly as described above. Security: We take our inspiration for the security notion of SASD from the unforgeability notion of SAS schemes [4] , [16] . The game begins with the generation of the key pair of the honest user that will be targeted in the attack. The forger is given as input and has access to a signing oracle . This oracle, on input a message and aggregate signed data , returns . In the random oracle model [17] , the forger is additionally given oracle access to one or more random functions. At the end of its execution, outputs its forgery . The forger wins the game iff and there exists an index such that (1) and (2) never made a signature query for any such that . We stress that our security notion does not use the KOSK assumption, i.e., the forger does not need to register the secret keys of corrupted signers involved in its signing queries or in its forgery.
II. SEQUENTIAL AGGREGATE SIGNED DATA
The advantage of is the probability that it wins the above game, where the probability is taken over the coins of , , and itself. In the random oracle model, the probability is also over the choice of the random function(s) implemented by the random oracle(s). We say that -breaks if it runs in time at most , makes at most signature queries, and has advantage at least , and aggregates contain at most signatures. This means that the aggregate signed data that submits to the signing oracle can contain at most signatures, and that its forgery can contain at most signatures. In the random oracle model, we additionally bound the number of queries that the adversary makes to each random oracle separately.
III. OUR MAIN CONSTRUCTION

Claw-Free Permutations:
A family of claw-free trapdoor permutations consists of a randomized permutation generation algorithm that on input outputs tuples describing permutations , over domain of size , and the corresponding trapdoor information for the inverse permutation . There must exist efficient algorithms that given , compute in time , that given , compute , and that given , compute for any . A claw-finding algorithm is said to -break if it runs in time at most and the probability is at least .
Other Ingredients: Let , be security parameters, where is a system-wide parameter but can be chosen by each signer independently as long as .
(Typical values for a security level of 80 bits in a factoring-based instantiation would be and .) Let be a family of claw-free trapdoor permutations so that associated to each permutation in the family there exists an additive abelian group such that . Let be the minimal density of in . We stress that need not be a permutation over , and that need not be homomorphic with respect to the group operation in . Let an efficient encoding algorithm that breaks up a message into a (shorter) message and an element , and let be the corresponding decoding algorithm that reconstructs from . We require that the decoding function is injective, meaning that . Finally, let and be public hash functions modeled as random oracles.
Intuition: Before presenting our scheme, we provide some intuition into the construction. First consider the following signature scheme with message recovery, that could be seen as a nonrandomized generalization of PSS-R [13] . The signer's public key is a permutation , the secret key is . To sign a message , he computes , , and
. The signature consists of the pair . Given partial message and signature , a verifier recomputes , , and returns iff . Observe that if the encoding is sufficiently dense , then the net signing overhead is limited to bits, since the bandwidth of is reused entirely for message recovery.
Two observations lead from this scheme to our scheme. First, the type of data that can be "embedded" in is not restricted to parts of the signed message; it could also be used for example to embed the signature of the previous signer. (The same idea actually underlies the scheme.) Second, suppose the signer wants to add a second signature on on top of . One idea to keep the net overhead at a constant bits could be to use and let the overall signed data be . The verifier can then recover from ; from ; and from . He accepts iff . A number of additional tweaks would be needed to make this scheme secure (we do not make any claims about its security here), but this is the rough idea.
The Scheme: We associate to the above building blocks the scheme as follows. Each signer generates a pair of clawfree trapdoor permutations . The public key is , the secret signing key is . The aggregate signing and verification algorithms are given in Fig. 1 .
Efficiency: Note that the verification algorithm only contains a simple check on the output size of , but does not check whether or whether really describes a permutation over . Indeed, unlike the scheme, our security analysis of the scheme points out that an honest signer's security is not affected by adversarially generated keys of cosigners. This opens the way to much cheaper instantiations from uncertified permutations such as low-exponent RSA and factoring. The true reason for this difference only becomes clear in the details of the security proof, but we try to give some intuition here. The crucial difference between our scheme and the scheme is that in the data embedded in , meaning
, is passed as an argument to the hash function , as was done in the signature scheme with message recovery that we sketched before. This extra security measure cannot be applied to the scheme however because the embedded data (the previous signature) is only recovered after evaluating . Lysyanskaya et al. overcome this problem in the security proof by simulating random oracles mapping into by choosing and returning . The correctness of this technique relies crucially on the fact that even adversarially generated are permutations. The security proof of , on the other hand, only uses this simulation technique for the honestly generated permutation . See the proof in Section V for details.
Also note that signers can independently choose their own value of the security parameter . The system-wide parameter can be set to a comfortably high value like or 512 without too much impact on performance. The exact overall bandwidth overhead depends on the length of the signed messages, the efficiency of the encoding algorithm, the family of permutations being used, the signers' security parameters and the density . For typical instantiations (see below), the net overhead varies from bits in case sufficiently long messages are being signed, meaning , up to bits for shorter messages. Finally, it is worth noting that the list of public keys contained in can of course be omitted from the transmitted data if the verifier already knows the public keys.
IV. INSTANTIATING OUR CONSTRUCTION
Instantiations From RSA: An RSA key generator [18] is a randomized algorithm that on input outputs tuples where is a -bit product of two large primes and . The RSA function is generally assumed to be a trapdoor one-way permutation over , where is the trapdoor that allows to compute . An algorithm is said to -break the one-wayness of if it runs in time at most and One can associate to a claw-free permutation family by taking , where . It is easy to see that if an algorithm -breaks this claw-free permutation, then there exists an algorithm that -breaks the one-wayness of . The most important advantage of our scheme over the scheme is that special RSA key generators can be used with small verification exponents, e.g., or . These have the advantage that the cost of a verification exponentiation (raising to exponent ) is reduced to that of a couple of multiplications.
Several options are available for the group , the additive group operation, the hash function , and the message encoding/decoding algorithms to be used. The most straightforward choice would be to use with multiplication modulo . A computationally more efficient choice however is to use with the XOR operation. To make optimal use of the bandwidth, one could also use in combination with the addition modulo . Alternatively, one can use the permutation family of [19] to save one bit of bandwidth per signer, but this comes at the cost of doubling the verification and signing time.
To estimate efficiency (see overview in Table I ), we consider the instantiation with and with the XOR operation, and we assume that signers use security parameter or smaller. The exact bandwidth overhead depends on the amount of "recoverable" data , but varies between bits in the best case and bits in the worst case. Typical bandwidth overhead will be around bits (for signers using the same security parameter and . The inverse of is the root . Since this is a permutation over , the same group operations, hash functions and message encoding algorithms can be used as described for RSA above.
One can associate a family of claw-free trapdoor permutations to by taking where . Algorithm is said to -factor if it runs in time at most and Given a claw , one can see that is a square root of , which with probability 1/2 is different from and thereby reveals the factorization of . Therefore, if an algorithm -breaks the claw-free permutation, then there exists an algorithm that -factors .
V. SECURITY OF OUR CONSTRUCTION
We prove the security of the scheme in the random oracle model under the claw-freeness of the permutation family . The following theorem gives a formal security statement with concrete security bounds. Proof: We first give an informal description of the sequential forger to provide some intuition into its strategy, and then give a formal description to derive the exact concrete security bounds. Given a nonsequential forger , we build a sequential forger as follows. Algorithm is given input and access to oracles , , and . It runs on the same input and simulates responses to 's , and oracle queries. To satisfy Property 1 of Definition 5.2, stores all previous responses to 's oracle queries in associative tables, retrieving the appropriate response from these tables when asks the same query again. Note that the algorithm is deterministic, so in a real attack repeating the same query to the signing oracle would result in the same signature being returned as well. Property 2 is satisfied by returning random values for 's malformed queries. To answer 's queries, simply relays responses from its own oracle. Correctly formed queries are treated in a more complicated manner. maintains a directed graph as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Each node is uniquely identified by a tuple , and each edge is uniquely identified by a tuple . We explicitly allow multiple directed edges between the same pair of nodes. Initially, the graph only contains a so-called root node . The idea is that all queries satisfying Property 3, so-called sequential queries, appear in edges in a tree rooted at , while all nonsequential queries appear in edges not connected to . We refer to the tree rooted at as the sequential tree. The creation of a new edge, however, should not violate the invariants that only sequential queries are represented by edges in the sequential tree, and that all of these queries were responded to using outputs of . Two types of problems that can occur are illustrated by the dashed arrows for query in Fig. 2 . The left arrow illustrates the situation when is such that the head node of the new edge coincides with an existing node in the sequential tree. This is a problem, because if later makes a query that "connects" to , then there exist two different sequences and that satisfy the requirements of Property 3, violating the uniqueness requirement. The right dashed arrow in Fig. 2 illustrates the situation when coincides with an existing node that is not part of the sequential tree. The newly created edge would suddenly incorporate into the sequential tree, but this violates the invariant because responded the query with a random value, rather than with an output of . To preempt these problems, aborts its execution whenever a new edge is added to the sequential tree with a head node that already exists in . We say that event occurs when this happens. Lemma 5.3 and to correctly analyze the probability that event occurs, we give a more formal pseudocode description of the sequential forger that we just described in Fig. 3 From the strategy of and Claim 5.4, it is clear that in the event the simulation of 's environment provided by is perfect, and that wins whenever wins (3) Equation (1) easily follows from (2), (3) and the following bound on the probability that event occurs:
Claim 5.4:
To see why this bound is correct, observe that when event occurs on line 215, was just assigned a fresh random value on line 211, so is random as well. We distinguish between the case that the call to on line 213 resulted in a new entry being added to , and the case that it didn't. In the latter case, must already have appeared in , but this happens with probability at most . In the former case, is a random value from , so the probability that already occurred as part of a node identifier is at most . Summing up over all calls to gives Lemma 5.3 says that we can safely restrict our attention to sequential forgers. The next lemma shows that any such forger can be turned into a claw-finding algorithm for . The proof is given below, and reuses ideas from [4] , [13] , [16] , and [20] .
Lemma 5.5: If there exists a sequential forger that -breaks , then there exists a claw-finding algorithm that -breaks for
Proof: Given a sequential forger against , consider the following claw-finding algorithm against . Algorithm maintains initially empty associative arrays and . On input , algorithm runs on target public key , and responds to its oracle queries as follows.
• [20] for a detailed analysis of 's success probability. Algorithm wins the game if forger wins and neither of and occurs, i.e.,
In the event the environment of is distributed exactly as in a real attack, so Event occurs only if already occurred in , where is a fresh random -bit string. The probability that this happens is therefore the number of entries in divided by . Summing over all queries to , we have The probability that event occurs is This probability is maximal for . Filling in this value gives so that the success probability of in finding a claw for is To estimate the running time of , we ignore all costs other than permutation evaluations. Each query explicitly induces permutation evaluations on average, but in fact hides an additional evaluation to maintain the graph structure that allows to find the sequence (see the proof of Lemma 5.3). The verification of the forgery takes up to additional permutations. Overall, we have that .
We can now shed some more technical light on how our security proof, unlike that of the scheme, does not rely on the fact that the permutation family be certified. The scheme involves a full-domain random oracle that essentially plays the combined role of our and oracles. In their proof, however, the responses of this oracle need to be simulated such that the claw-finding algorithm knows a related preimage for all permutations , rather than just the target permutation . The standard way to do this is to choose a random preimage and compute the random oracle output as . This output is only correctly distributed, however, if really is a permutation, hence the requirement that be certified. In our proof, the algorithm only needs to know preimages related to queries , and can therefore sample random elements from directly to simulate responses for with .
VI. VARIATIONS ON THE MAIN CONSTRUCTION
Sequential Aggregate Signatures:
If the message recovery functionality of our scheme is undesirable, then the following "purebred" sequential aggregate signature scheme is easily derived from our scheme. The signer's public and private key are again a permutation and its inverse ; aggregate signing and verification are as follows: Just like the scheme, the scheme allows for efficient instantiations based on low-exponent RSA and factoring, and allows signers to independently choose their security parameter . The signature size depends on various issues such as the used encoding and permutation family, but for the instantiation based on RSA with and moduli of size at most , the signature will be at most bits long. Signing and verification take the same effort as for the scheme. The scheme can be proved secure in the random oracle model under the standard (non-KOSK) security notion of [4] , [16] . The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 5.1; the definition of a sequential forger needs to be adapted to queries of the form , and nodes in the graph will be identified by tuples . The concrete security bounds are identical to those obtained in Theorem 5.1.
Achieving Tight Security: Closer inspection of Theorem 5.1 learns that the reduction loses a factor in the success probability of the claw-finding algorithm . In principle, this means that higher security parameters have to be used in order to achieve the same security level, thereby increasing the length of keys and signatures. One can apply the techniques of Katz-Wang [21] however to obtain a scheme with a tight security reduction, at the minimal cost of an increase in signature length of bits. (The same techniques have also been applied to achieve tight security for the scheme in [16] .) Key generation is as for the scheme, signing and verification are as follows: Else return .
Algorithm
The signing algorithm described here is stateful, but as already noted in [21] it can easily be made stateless by using an additional random oracle to generate as . Alternatively, one can generate using a pseudo-random function and include the key in the signing key . In the latter case, the security of the scheme additionally relies on the pseudo-randomness of , of course. The proof of the following theorem is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 5.1 using techniques from [16] , [21] . For completeness it is given in detail in the Appendix. When all signers are authenticating the same message , a more efficient scheme exists that does not require any interaction among the signers at all (as opposed to the sequential interaction required for the other schemes in this paper). Here, all signers independently generate their signature shares, which can then be combined by any third party into the final signature.
Syntax and Security: A multi-signed data (MSD) scheme is a tuple of algorithms . A signer generates his own key pair via . Each signer creates a partial signature on via . Any third party can combine a list of partial signatures into the final signed data via . The verification algorithm returns to indicate that is valid for signers and message , or returns to indicate rejection. Correctness requires that with probability one for all messages if all signers behave honestly. In the experiment defining security, the forger is given a freshly generated public key as input, and has access to a signing oracle for the corresponding secret key . It wins if it can output a forgery such that with for some and never queried to the signing oracle. We say that -breaks if it runs in time at most , makes at most signing queries, its forgery contains at most signatures, and wins the above game with probability at least . In the random oracle model, we additionally bound the maximum number of queries that can make to each random oracle separately.
The Scheme: Let , be security parameters where is chosen by each signer independently and is fixed system-wide. Let be a family of claw-free trapdoor permutations, let for be a group, and let and be random oracles, exactly as for the scheme. The encoding and decoding functions are different though: we assume two separate encoding algorithms , , and a decoding algorithm such that outputs a group element ; outputs a partial message ; and the injective function reconstructs the original message . Key generation consists again of generating a random permutation as the public key and its inverse as secret key; the signing, combining, and verification algorithms are described below. 
Security:
We prove the scheme secure in the random oracle model under the claw-freeness of the permutation family . The proof reuses techniques from [13] , [20] and is given below. The proof loses a factor in the reduction; a tight variant can be constructed using the techniques of Katz-Wang [21] . 
The event occurs if during the simulation of all signature queries and for the forgery. In the event the value of used in the forgery must be different from any of the ones involved in any of the signing queries, so we have that (7) This expression reaches a minimum for , where we have that (8) Putting together (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) yields the bound on in Theorem 5.1. Ignoring the time needed for all computations other than permutation evaluations, the bound on the running time of in Theorem 5.4 is clear from the construction of .
Instantiations:
One can obtain instantiations of from low-exponent RSA and factoring using the same permutation families and group structures described in Section IV. For the encoding function, one could for example split the message in -bit blocks (e.g., when using RSA) and let be the first bits of the block with index where is a noncryptographic hash function. The function returns the remaining bits of ; decoding works by reconcatenating the different message parts in the correct order. For long enough messages (in particular, ), there is no overlap between the message parts of different co-signers, and achieves the promised length savings.
Alternatively, if the list of co-signers is known at the time of signing, one could modify the scheme so that encoding is more effective for short messages. Namely, one could use a single encoding function that ensures there is no overlap between the different message parts. In this case, however, the scheme needs to be modified to include in the computation of , because otherwise there may exist (contrived) encoding algorithms that render the scheme insecure.
To explain the efficiency estimates in Table I , we assume an RSA-based instantiation with and with the XOR operation. The net bandwidth overhead depends on the length of the message and, related to that, on the number of "collisions" between the recovered message parts for different signers. In the best case, i.e., and no collisions, the net overhead is bits. In the worst case, i.e., , the overhead is . Signing involves a single modular exponentiation, while verification takes evaluations of , which can be performed by modular multiplications. We consider the instantiation with and with the XOR operation, and we assume that signers use security parameter or smaller. The exact bandwidth overhead depends on the amount of "recoverable" data , but varies between bits in the best case and bits in the worst case. Typical bandwidth overhead will be around bits (for signers using the same security parameter and ). The most expensive operations in signing and verification are the computations of and , which for take two modular multiplications and one modular exponentiation each, respectively. Ignoring cheap operations such as XORs and hash function evaluations, verifying aggregate signed data by signers takes modular multiplications. Placing a signature on top of an aggregate of signers takes multiplications (to verify the existing aggregate) and one exponentiation.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 6.1: As for the proof of Theorem 5.1, we will do the proof of Theorem 6.1 in two steps. First, we modify the definition of a sequential forger of Definition 5.2 to queries of the form , and we show that for any forger there exists a sequential forger achieving the same bounds as those stated in Lemma 5.3 for the scheme. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of that of Lemma 5.3, and is omitted here. Theorem 6.1 follows easily from (the adaptation of) Lemma 5.3 and the following lemma.
Lemma A.1: If there exists a sequential forger that -breaks , then there exists a claw-finding algorithm that -breaks for
Proof: Given a sequential forger against , we build a claw-finding algorithm against . Algorithm maintains initially empty associative arrays and . On input , algorithm runs on target public key , and responds to its oracle queries as follows.
• Since for the forgery 's view is independent of the bit , we have that
To estimate the running time of , we ignore all costs other than permutation evaluations. Each query explicitly induces permutation evaluations on average, but hides an another evaluation to maintain the graph structure. The verification of the forgery takes up to permutations. Overall, we have that
